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Abstract
Does asymmetry between Internet Providers affect the “fairness” of their
interconnection contracts? While recent game theoretic literature provides
contrasting answers to this question, there is a lack of empirical research. We
introduce a novel dataset on micro-interconnection policies and provide an
econometric analysis of the determinants of peering decisions amongst the
Internet Service Providers interconnecting at the London Internet Exchange
Point (LINX). Our key result shows that two different metrics, introduced to
capture asymmetry, exert opposite effects. Asymmetry in “market size”
enhances the quality of the link, while asymmetry in “network centrality”
induces quality degradation, hence  “unfairer” interconnection conditions.
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61 Introduction
Antitrust authorities are showing increasing interest in the analysis of
interconnection agreements used by Internet Operators to exchange traffic
packets. They focus on two-sided interconnection decisions to detect both
actual and potential abuse of a position of significant market power1. In this
setting a dominant position may lead to the establishment of “unfair”
clauses associated to the bilateral exchanges of traffic.
A growing literature is focussing on the issue of access pricing and
interconnection quality in the Internet Industry (Foros, Kind, and Sørgard
2002; Crémer et al. 2000; Foros and Hansen, 2001; Economides 1998, to name
just a few). The actual interconnection regime between a pair of providers is
clearly the result of a strategic game. In particular, the Internet operators are
in a relationship of both complementarity (each network must be able to
access each other in order to assure the Internet universal connectivity) and
competitiveness (over downstream customers). One stream of the theoretical
debate2 focussed on the main trade off underlying the interconnection
choice: a better quality of the interconnection between a pair of providers
has a positive effect on the networks’ performance (network externality
effect) and may justify higher prices for the service offered; however, it also
reduces the networks’ differentiation in terms of quality, which may result
in a loss of customers for the “higher quality” network to the advantage of
the “smaller quality network”(business stealing effect). The relative size of
these two effects determines the eventual extent of quality degradation in
interconnection, decided by the larger (better quality) providers.
The theoretical literature on interconnection games provided
contrasting results on this trade-off, motivating the need for more empirical
research. This is however still scarce, and mainly anecdotic, essentially
because of the confidentiality that characterizes the two-sided
interconnection agreements and Internet traffic data. Our work provides a
contribution in this direction: this is possible thanks to a novel approach to
obtain data, which follows recent advances in the fields of Theoretical
Computer Science3.
                                                
1 During the 1998 MCI WorldCom merger analysis the European Commission included in the
backbone market all the providers which were able to obtain global connectivity either through
private or public peering, needing no transit contracts. This definition was subsequently modified:
only the providers reaching global connectivity exclusively via private peering were included in the
backbone market. See Official Journal Of the European Commission (2000),  Regulation (EEC) N
4046/89, Merger Procedure, Bruxelles, European Commission, DGXIII. See also Buccirossi et al. (2005).
2 Crémer et al. (2000); Economides (2005); Foros and Hansen (2001); Baake and Wichmann (1999);
Badasyan and Chakrabarti (2003); Mah (2005); Weiss and Shin (2004); Jahn and Prüfer (2004), Ida
(2005), to name just a few.
3 The interest of Computer Scientists and Mathematicians focus for the actual interconnection
agreements is linked to the representation and analysis of the evolution of the Internet topology (Bar
et al., 2005), and its efficiency from a Network optimisation point of view (Heckmann et al., 2004) .
7We assess the claim that asymmetry between Providers affects the
“fairness” of their interconnection contracts. In other words, we investigate
if asymmetry is associated to quality degradation, expressed by the refusal
of peering4. We focus on the interconnection decisions involving providers
that compete in the same market, considering, in particular, the large
number of two by two interconnection decisions amongst the Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) members of the London Internet Exchange Point (LINX).
 The peculiar nature of the Internet asks for the analysis of different
metrics5 to assess the competitor’s asymmetry.  Our key result, based on the
econometric analysis of the ISPs interconnection patterns, shows that the
two asymmetry’s metrics introduced have opposite effects on the bilateral
peering decisions. Asymmetry in “market size” facilitates peering, while
asymmetry in “network centrality” makes peering less likely and hence
interconnection conditions “unfairer”. This clear result should not be
surprising when thinking about the nature of network industries and
specifically of the Internet, where, given the richness and redundancy of
possible interconnection modalities, necessarily one has to consider more
than one dimension for the measurement of size, and therefore of
asymmetry.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the
subject and discusses some technical aspects about Internet peering, while
Section 3 focuses on the game theoretic results on interconnection
agreements. Section 4 explains the process of data gathering and the criteria
used to classify the Internet Operators. Section 5 provides the econometric
analysis of the relevant model. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Internet hierarchy, peering and transit
Internet operators may be classified into different categories, depending
upon their position in the Internet hierarchy. At the top level there are the
Tier-1 Transit Providers and the Internet Backbones (IBPs): they constitute the
upstream industry (Kende, 2000) providing universal connectivity to the
downstream industry, constituted by operators of smaller dimensions
(Internet Service Providers6, or ISPs). At a further lower level in the Internet
                                                
4 Peering and Transit are the two main categories of interconnection agreements. See below for the
definitions.
5 We will indeed focus on two different notions of size, both explained below, one, the customer cone,
providing a proxy for “market share” and the second, betweenness, expressing the market power of
any given players, by showing how unavoidable a given operator is in the Internet traffic flows, given
the set of existing Interconnection policies.
6 This term has now fallen into a general looser usage, but it is properly used to describe regional
providers that typically connect to multiple backbone providers (Woodcock, 2002).
8hierarchy there are the so-called Internet Access Providers, or IAPs, which
usually obtain connectivity through a single connection to an ISP.
The dominant feature of the Internet, the Network of networks, is the
universal connectivity: each user is able to access each other; this is only
possible thanks to the system of bilateral interconnections between the
Internet Operators. There are a variety of commercial agreements, but these
can be essentially divided into two main categories: transit and peering.
• The transit agreement leads to a unilateral provider-to-customer
relationship: the customer is provided connectivity to the entire
Internet, in front of a payment of a settlement fee, by the provider. In
other words, the customer can send to the provider traffic that is
destined anywhere and the provider will get the traffic there.
• The peering agreement leads to a bilateral peer-to-peer relationship:
each peer provides the other connectivity to its own network
(customers) only, usually without any settlement fee7.
A relevant incentive to the realisation of peering is that it leads to a
reduction in traffic costs, since the Internet Operators do not have to pay for
the traffic routed through peering networks8. Norton (2002a) notices that,
although that argument is given for granted, this is not always true, since
the costs incurred to connect the networks and maintaining the peering
point may offset the advantages in terms of less transit costs. However, the
costs of peering fell sharply in the recent years, after the development of the
Internet Exchange Points9 (IXPs). Peering also leads to a better performance in
the traffic between the two networks involved, through a lower latency in
the transmission of packets.
Although the advantages from peering, outlined above, are relevant,
many Internet Operators still exchange traffic through a transit relationship.
This reflects the fact that peering is a bilateral agreement, and in order for
peering to be realised the two networks must both find it profitable. A very
consistent argument is that peering is based on the equality of size10 between
                                                
7 This is known as Sender Keeps All (SKA) peering, or Bill and Keep peering.
8 This is a general feature of the peering agreement. However, recently some networks reached paid
peering interconnection (Miller, 2002).
9 Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) are meeting points that provide switches to the members ISPs, so
that they can exchange traffic without the need to build dedicated extra circuits. However, this does
not necessarily mean that private peering is more costly than peering within the IXP, since in the latter
case the providers bear the cost of getting to the exchange point, the membership fees, and the cost for
using the switches. Xu et al. (2004) find that the percentage of peering agreements between ISPs
participating at IXPs is significantly higher than the percentage characterising the whole Internet,
providing evidence that IXPs plays an important role in shaping the relationships betweens Internet
operators.
10 According to Filstrup (2001), who reports the selective peering criteria released by WorldCom, the
symmetry in size is expressed in terms of a balance in the geographic scope , traffic across the peering
point, capacity and traffic volume.
9the two providers (Norton, 2002a; Kende, 2000; Filstrup, 2001 to name just a
few). Indeed, two commonly argued reasons seem to prevent peering
between a large operator and a small operator: they are the so-called
backbone free riding and the business stealing effect.
The free riding refers to the fact that the smaller network uses the
capacity of the largest network for free. The business stealing refers to the
following: larger size implies better performance of the network; if two
networks of different sizes peer, then this barrier falls and the larger
network may lose customers to the advantage of the, usually cheaper,
smaller network.
Another element that is said to negatively affect peering is the fact that,
contrary to transit, peering agreements do not have Service Level
Agreements (SLAs) that guarantees rapid repair if problems occur. Norton
(2003) argues that denying peering may lead to a transit relationship, from
which the upstream provider benefits: this may prevent large upstream
providers to engage in peering with “potential downstream customers”.
A further element involves the technological aspect of traffic routing.
Since carrying traffic is costly, when a packet has to be delivered from a
network a to a network b (either because there is a peering or transit
relationship between them), the network a has the incentive to deliver the
packet to b following the shortest path. If the networks are connected at
many exchange points, each network is able to route relatively soon the
traffic to the destination network, which thus bears the large part of the
transmission packet’s costs. Hence, mutual presence at more exchange
points is argued to positively affect peering. Interestingly, this conclusion is
strengthened by Titley (1997): he maintains that the pairs of providers
having several peering relationships enjoy a positive reputation effect,
which enhances the likelihood of further peering being realised.
Other elements make the understanding of peering even more
complex. Indeed, Norton (2002b) argues that also the way in which peering
negotiations are conducted is likely to affect the final decision. The
theoretical models of peering games all assume the so-called direct approach:
the initiator network asks the target network for peering; then, the target
network accepts only if he finds peering profitable.   In reality, there are many
different tactics. Norton presents nineteen manoeuvres used by the
interviewed Peering Coordinators, showing that the choice of the right tactic
is crucial, since it can lead to peering even when the direct approach would
not work11.
                                                
11 Two tactics that proved to be very effective are the “transit with peering migration” and the “end
run”. The first manoeuvre consists in reaching a transit agreement to be muted into a peering
agreement if the peering prerequisites fixed by the target network are reached. The second tactic
consists of negotiating peering directly with the largest customers of the target network, in order to
reduce in this way the costs of transit. “Less honest”, but apparently quite effective, manoeuvres are
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3 Game theoretic models of Internet peering
One of the earliest theoretical works on the interconnection strategies
between competing operators is due to Crémer, Rey, and Tirole (2000). They
study the interconnection decision between two backbones, with one having
a larger installed base of consumers; the backbones compete à la Cournot
over the unattached consumers.  They consider a two stage game. In the first
stage each backbone i chooses a quality iθ  for the interconnection; the
effective quality of interconnection is then { }21 ,min θθ . Given the
interconnection quality, the backbones choose their capacities and prices.
The solution of the game relies on the comparison between two effects of
degrading interconnection quality. If the connectivity between the two
networks is degraded, both backbones face a demand reduction (their
customers’ access to each others deteriorates). However, the degradation of
the connectivity leads to a greater quality differentiation between the two
networks, which increases with the extent of network externality12. The
larger backbone gains competitive advantage on the smaller one. Hence,
Crémer et al. show that the largest network has incentives to degrade
interconnection with the smaller networks to further increase its market
share (it attracts customers because he can offer a better quality service of
the other13).
On the same line are the results of Jahn and Prüfer (2004), and Weiss
and Shin (2004). Jahn and Prüfer (2004) consider two Internet Operators that
have a fixed base of customers, while they compete in prices over consumers
located in a battlezone14. They show that sufficiently symmetric in size
(represented by the number of customers locked) networks reach a peering
agreement; otherwise an upstream intermediary is used to exchange traffic.
Weiss and Shin (2004) argue that the interconnection regime is based on the
                                                                                                                                         
the “traffic manipulation” and the “bluff”. The first has the aim to the instigating ISP forces its traffic
over the potential peers’ transit services, to maximize the target ISP’s cost of accessing its traffic;
concerning the “bluff”, sometimes the assertion of strength is not subject to proof by analysis of traffic,
hence can work”.
12 Indeed, in the model of Crémer et al., the quality of the service of the backbone i is given by
( ) ( )[ ]jjiii qqvs +++= βθβ , where iβ  is the installed base of customers of the backbone i, iq  is the
number of unattached customers enrolled by backbone i, [ ]1,0∈θ  is the quality of interconnection,
and v  a parameter that reflects the importance of connectivity.
13 We referred before to this as the business stealing effect.
14 The two networks are ex ante connected through an intermediary, defined as the cheapest Tier-1
provider. In the first stage of the game, the two networks decide non cooperatively about the
interconnection regime: if they do not reach a peering regime (either bill and keep or paid), then they
remain connected through the intermediary. In the subsequent stage the two networks set prices,
competing à la Hotelling over the consumers on the battlezone. Finally, consumers choose the
network to subscribe with. Hence, while in Crémer et al. the strategic variable is the interconnection
quality, here the strategic variable is the interconnection regime.
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traffic volume, which, in turn, is linked to market share. Their model shows
that symmetry in traffic positively affects peering15.
Although the result that difference in size negatively affects peering is
commonly accepted, there are some situations where it does not seem to
work. First of all, peering does not necessarily imply business stealing if the
networks are sufficiently differentiated. Secondly, the negative effects of
business stealing and free riding may be offset by other positive effects
caused by network externalities. We now briefly point at these issues.
Since Internet Operators compete for downstream customers (either
end users or other Internet providers), their interconnection strategy
depends upon the preferences of these customers. Courcoubetis and Weber
(2003) argue that “the decision as to whether or not peering is beneficial depends
on the way the networks are differentiated and on the importance that their
customers place on the differentiating parameters, such as size and location.” In this
direction, Foros and Hansen (2001) consider horizontal differentiation
between two Internet Service Providers that compete á la Bertrand16,
obtaining the opposite result as Crémer et al. (2000). They present a two
stage game: in the first stage, the two Internet Operators choose the
interconnection quality, while in the second the two firms compete over end
customers. In this setting, where also the assumption of the Operators
having an installed customer base is removed, the network externality effect
is the driving force that leads the firms to increase the interconnection
quality. Mason (1999) studies competition between ISPs that are both
horizontally and vertically differentiated, obtaining results in line with Foros
and Hansen (2001).
The network externality effect is also relevant in Baake and Wichmann
(1999). In their model two Internet Operators that are Cournot competitors
are interconnected through a backbone, and the interconnection quality can
be improved by direct peering. Baake and Wichmann show that the peering
decision may be profitable even if leads to a lower market share (because of
the business stealing effect) for one of the networks; indeed, both networks
may charge higher prices for the increased quality of the service offered after
                                                
15 In their model there is one IBP in the upstream market and two ISPs in the downstream market. The
realisation of peering between the two ISPs occurs where both of them take advantage from the
reduction in the transit costs . Given the assumptions of the model, where traffic is associated with the
market share, this occurs when the difference in the traffic volume of the two ISPs does not exceed a
certain value k. Indeed, when the traffic generated differs significantly, the larger provider mainly
routes its traffic within its network, and the fees paid to the upstream IBP are minimal. Hence, the
large provider’s dominant strategy is not to peer, while the small provider would be better off in case
of peering.
16
 Preference for variety due to differentiation is driving the incentives for ISPs  of interconnection in
Giovannetti (2002).
12
that peering is realised17. On the same line, Economides (2005) shows that,
“with the same assumptions as Crémer et al. (2000) except now allowing for
customer migration, the market equilibrium shows no (size) dominance by any firm
and no network has incentive to degrade interconnection”. Indeed, when
customers can migrate, the interconnection degradation becomes
unprofitable, and the possibility to exploit network externalities between
operators leads to an increase in interconnection. This result is particularly
relevant given the development of ISP multihoming and ISP customers
multihoming18, since it allows greater customer migration between different
upstream providers. Hence, while in Crémer et al. (2000) even a slightly
larger network will refuse to interconnect with other networks, in
Economides (2005) network externalities and demand for universal
connectivity will force networks to interconnect. In this setting, other
strategies, such as increase in the prices of the service offered, are more
profitable than degrading interconnection. The role of network externalities
(modelled by the weight that consumers attribute to congestion and
connection failure when choosing the provider) is present also in Badasyan
and Chakrabarti (2003). They study the incentives of Internet providers,
already connected through a National Access Point (NAP), to engage in
private peering. Contrarily to the other models, in this work the peering
decisions are endogenous, following the theory of endogenous network
formation19.
                                                
17 The effect of an increase in the interconnection quality on Operator i’s profit can be divided into
three main components: a direct effect, an indirect effect and the business stealing effect. The direct
effect is positive given the assumptions in the model, and its value depends on both cost and network
effects: an increase in the interconnection quality lowers the cost paid for transit, and also it increases
the perceived network size for i’s customers, and hence the price they are willing to pay. The indirect
effect, which also depends on both a cost and a price component, is negative. This effect is
strengthened by the business stealing. The combination of the effects illustrated above makes it
possible that peering might still be profitable despite losing market share.
18 An ISP is multihomed when it has two or more upstream providers (large backbones or regional
backbones). The main reason to multihome is that is permits to maintain full connectivity even if one
of the upstream providers has huge problems. The rationale behind ISP customers multihoming is
exactly the same.
19 Badasyan and Chakrabarti (2003) consider both the Bala and Goyal (2000) fully non-cooperative
approach, where Internet Operators signal their willingness to engage in peering, and peering is
realised when a reciprocal will is found, and the Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) approach, where
mutual consent is needed for the peering to be reached.
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4 Gathering the data and classification of Internet Operators
4.1 Inferring the commercial agreements
Obtaining data on two-sided interconnection agreements from firms is a
very difficult task. This is particularly true for the Internet, where almost
everything that is relevant to the Economic Research is labelled
“confidential”: prices, traffic flows, commercial agreements, and so on. Our
interest lies in the study of commercial agreements. A source of information
is available on the websites of some Internet Exchange Points; in particular,
these websites provide a symmetric matrix with entries 0 or 1 (the peering
matrix), where 1 indicates the presence of interconnection (through peering
or transit). The major drawback with these data is that it is not possible to
analyse the strategic decisions between peering and transit. The dataset used
in the present work permits to overcome this problem. The strategy
followed to create the dataset is linked to recent developments in the field of
Theoretical Computer Sciences. Indeed we apply recently developed
algorithms in order to infer the actual bilateral business relationship
between any given pair of Internet providers from publicly available data20.
The algorithms used to infer the business relationships can be grouped
into two main categories, depending upon the source of data on which the
inference is based upon:
• Inference from Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
• Inference from the Internet Routing Registry (IRR)
The Border Gateway Protocol is a series of “instructions” that govern
the transmission of packets over the Internet through connected
independent networks. This protocol governs what is known as Interdomain
Routing, the micro-specification of the two-sided interconnection policies
established between competing providers in need of Universal connectivity.
These policies, specified in the BGP data set, are indeed the empirical
implementations of the interconnection strategies analysed in the game
theoretic literature discuss above.
Our second source of data is derived from Internet Routing Registries.
These IRRs are large databases where Internet Service Providers willingly
publish their routing policies21. More specifically the data used in our
econometric estimation of the drives of the bilateral interconnection
                                                
20 The interest behind the inference of business relationships between Internet Operators in the field of
Computer Science and Mathematics is linked to the analysis of the Internet Protocols used to transfer
packets in the Internet.
21 Routing policies mainly consists of two elements: route preferences and filtering policies; route
preferences indicate, when multiple routes to the same destination are available, which one is
preferred; filtering policies are instead used in order to hide some of the exported routes, or to filter
some of the routes imported from Internet Operators.
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decisions among Internet Operators where obtained mainly by using the
algorithm devised by Huber et al. (2004), based on the Internet Routing
Registry; this information was complemented with inference based on the
BGP tables22 (Gao, 2001; Subramanian et al., 2002; Di Battista et al., 2003).  The
fact that the information provided in the IRR by the Internet Operator is
merely voluntary23 led to the beliefs that the IRR is poorly maintained, with
obvious consequences on the actual reliability of the inferred relationships.
However, Siganos and Faloutsos (2004) were able to derive a relatively large
subset of data from IRR that were up to date and consistent with the
observed BGP tables24.
4.2 Units of Analysis:  IBPs and ISPs
Following Filstrup (2001) and Weiss and Shin (2004), we differentiate
between three classes of providers among Internet Operators25: Tier-1, IBPs
                                                
22 This approach uses the BGP table paths to derive an undirected graph that connects Autonomous
Systems. Then it makes uses of some central assumptions to infer the commercial relationships from
these paths. A central assumption is that valid paths are valley free; in other words, in any path there
can be only one consecutive chain of upstream relationships and one consecutive of downstream
relationships: the path starts with an AS, which is customer of the next upstream provider, and so on
until the path reaches a peak, where it starts to descend.
The inference of the commercial relationships can be seen as a two step process. In the first stage,
given the undirected graph obtained from the BGP tables, the following Type of Relationship-D-Simple
problem is solved: “Given an undirected graph G, a set of paths,  and an integer k, find an orientation
to all the edges of G such that the number of invalid paths is at most k”. In the second step, the directed
graph obtained as the solution of the previous problem is refined to introduce peering relationships.
The problem to be solved is the following: “Given an undirected graph G, a set of paths, and an
integer k, find an orientation to some of the edges of G such that the number of invalid paths is at most
k”.
The first attempt in this direction is due to Gao (2001). The algorithm used by Gao bases the inference
on the degree of each node (the degree of a node is defined as the number of edges that touch that
node), considered an indicator of the AS’s size. Subramanian et al. (2002) analyse the BGP tables-
related graph from different vantage points, and base the inference on a probability measure attached
to each edge orientation. Di Battista et al. (2003) introduce a new algorithm that reduces the number of
invalid paths estimated with the approach of Subramanian et al. (2002). Dimitropoulos et al. (2005)
provide some arguments against the approach of Subramanian et al. (2002) and Di Battista et al. (2003),
showing that other approaches that are not devoted to minimise the number of invalid paths produce
more realistic results.
An evaluation of the inference methods is provided by Xia and Gao (2004). They find that both the
Gao approach and the Subramanian et al. approach are very effective in detecting transit relationships,
while the accuracy for peering is significantly lower.
23 There seem not to be any economic incentive or regulatory duty for Internet Operators to update the
Internet Routing Registries.
24 The drawbacks characterising the BGP approach depends instead on the assumptions made to
translate paths into commercial relationships. Xia and Gao (2004) evaluated several BGP-based
inference approaches, showing that about 98% of the relationships inferred as transit are correct, while
about 70% of the relationships inferred as peering are correct. Huber et al. (2004) find that the
algorithm based on the IRR produces good inference with respect to the BGP-based inference.
25 Today there are less than 10 Tier-1 providers and over 40 Internet backbones, and their number is
increasing. Tiers-1 are characterised by the fact that they exchange traffic between them through
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and ISPs. We follow a two-step process: firstly we classify the providers into
the above categories, and then we perform our econometric analysis on the
inferred interconnection patterns among ISPs.
The population of Internet Operators considered is given by the
members of the London Internet Exchange Point (LINX), one of the most
important Internet Exchange Points in Europe according to both number of
members and traffic routed. Although the Internet structure is continuous
and it is not possible to find a clear cut point to separate Internet Operators
into the categories of IBPs and ISPs, it is possible to roughly accomplish this
preliminary task by looking at the estimated customer cone of the Internet
Operators. This concept, the closest possible empirical estimate of “Market
Size” for an Internet Operator has been introduced by the Cooperative
Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA). They estimated the customer
cone of the Internet Providers, and then ranked the providers according to
this measure. We used both the customer cone and the rank measure to
separate the providers into IBPs and ISPs, where the customer cone measure
is given by the number of /24 address spaces contained in all the customers
of each provider26.
 The original list of LINX members is given by 179 Internet Operators.
49 providers were deleted since there were no estimated interconnection
agreements27. Among the remaining 130 providers, we individuated 5 Top
Tier-1 Operators (Level3, Global Crossing, CWA, UUNet, NTT/Verio); these
providers have customer cone greater than 4,000,000/24s. The group of IBPs
(18) is given by the providers with rank below 50; these providers are all
characterised by customer cone between 3,600,000 and 3,500,000. Finally, the
set of ISPs (98) consists of the providers having rank greater than 50 and
customer cone lower by at least one order of magnitude with respect to the
IBPs; this category is very heterogeneous, containing providers with
customer cone between 380,000 and 16.
The following figure 1 represents the inferred commercial agreements
for the class of Internet Service Providers. The table shows the symmetric
                                                                                                                                         
peering, while they have generally only transit agreements with ISPs. There are more than 10,000 ISPs.
They obtain universal connectivity to multiple interconnections with Tier-1 and or backbone providers
(through transit or peering). IAPs are typically tied to the Internet mainly through a single connection
to an ISP, and do not generally participate in any peering points.
26 CAIDA provides three alternative measures of the customer cone of a given Autonomous System
(an Autonomous System, or AS, is a network that is administered by a single set of management rules
that are controlled by one person, group or organization). The simplest measure of the customer cone
of a certain AS is given by the number of its customers (other ASes) .A more precise measure
considers instead not the number of customers in the cone but the total number of prefixes that they
advertise. Each prefix consists of several /24-address-space-segments, hence the most precise measure
of customer cone of a certain AS considers the total number of /24-network-segments contained in all
its customers. We use the #/24-network-segments metric to rank the ISPs, since this is the metric that
promises the least number of inaccuracies.
27 This is essentially due to lack of data in the Internet Routing Registry about the providers involved.
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peering matrix characterising ISPs. The Internet Operators are sorted
according to their increasing rank28 in the Internet hierarchy.
Figure 1: Inferred Interconnection Agreements
Internet Operators  ISPs
              ISPs
5 ISPs interconnection model
This section is devoted to the econometric analysis of the interconnection
relationships among competing Internet Operators. As we argued before, we
focussed on the class of Internet Service Providers that are members of the
LINX.
5.1 Empirical specification
The interconnection patterns between ISPs are expressed by a binary model,
with the two possible outcomes given by peering and no interconnection;
indeed, the traffic agreement typically involves relationships between ISPs
and IBPs only. The inferred relationships are consistent with this theoretical
argument: 98 ISPs were considered, giving rise to 4753 pairs; among these
                                                
28 Notice that a larger rank corresponds to a lower customer cone.
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relationships, 2674 were inferred as peering, while 2079 were inferred as no
relationship.
The dependent variable is the peering decision, assuming value 1 when
peering between the pair of providers occurs and 0 otherwise. The
explanatory variables are devised to model the competitors’ asymmetry, the
geographical differentiation (coverage), and some technical elements, such
as the hot potato routing effect.
As we argued before, the peculiar nature of the Internet asks for the
utilisation of different metrics to assess the asymmetry between any pair of
providers.  The first measure considered is the difference in their customer
cones. In particular, the customer cone is used as a proxy for market shares: for
any pair of providers, the difference in their customer cones (diff_24s) gives a
market share-focussed measure of asymmetry.
The second measure introduced involves instead a market power-
focussed measure of asymmetry, given by the difference in the providers’
betweenness (diff_bet). Following Shimbel (1953) we calculated the following
measure of betweenness centrality for each Internet Operator v 29 :
( ) ( )∑
∈≠≠
=
Vtvs
sts vvB σ
where  ( ) ( )vv tsst σσ =  is the number of shortest BGP paths from the Internet
Operator s to the Operator t on which the v lies on. Hence, betweenness
expresses the market power of  any given player, by showing how
unavoidable, a given operator is, in the Internet traffic flows, given the set of
existing Interconnection policies.
The geographical differentiation is modelled by using two variables. A
first variable, dist_hq, expresses the distance (in thousands of miles) between
the headquarters of the Internet Operators. The distance was calculated
following a two steps process: first, we located each Internet Operator by
considering the latitude and longitude of its headquarter; then we estimated
the distance between headquarters using the great circle distance rule30. A
second variable, diff_ixp, takes into account the different geographical
coverage: for any pair of providers, this variable represents the difference in
                                                
29  D’Ignazio and Giovannetti (2006) have used this metric to assess HHI market concentration
indexes, we focus instead on the micro bilateral interconnection choices.
30 dist(Operator1- Operator 2) = RadiusEarth*ArcCos(Cos(Radians(90-Lat1))*Cos(Radians(90-Lat2))
+Sin(Radians(90-Lat1))*Sin(Radians(90-Lat2))* Cos(Radians(Long1-Long2)))
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the number of memberships among the most important Internet Exchange
Points all over the world31 that they have.
In order to model the technical element behind the hot potato routing
effect, we constructed a variable, both_ixp, indicating, for each pair of
providers, the number of IXPs at which they are both present32. The variable
both_ixp could also be interpreted as expressing a reputation effect, following
Titley (1997).
Table 1: Description of the variables
dependent variable
peering (dummy)
Assumes value 1 in case of peering between providers, 0
otherwise.
independent variables
diff_24s
Difference in the number of /24s for any pair of providers in
units of thousands
dist_hq
Distance (thousands of miles) between the headquarters of
the two providers
both_ixp Number of IXPs in which both the providers are present.
diff_ixp
Difference in the number of IXPs in which both the
providers are present
diff_bet Difference in the betweenness measure in thousands of units.
5.2 Estimation results
We estimated both a probit and a logit model by maximum likelihood.
Table 2: ISPs binary model results
Dependent Variable: peering
Independent Variable Probit Logit
diff_24s 0.004 0.008
(10.26) (9.26)
                                                
31 We considered 45 IXPs. All the 35 members of Euro-IX were included (Aix Athens, Ams-ix
Amsterdam, Bcix Berlin, Bix Budapest, Bnix Brussels, Catnix Barcelona, Cixp Geneva, De-cix
Frankfurt, Espanix Madrid, Ficix Helsinki, Gigapix Lisbon, Gn-ix Groningen, In-ex Dublin, Lix
Luxembourg, Mix Milan, Msk-ix Moscow, Namex Rome, Ndix Enschede, Netnod Stockholm, Nix
Oslo, Nix.cx Prague, Nota Miami, Parix Paris, Ronix Bucharest, Six Ljubljana, Tix Zurich, Topix
Torino, Vix Vienna, Linx London, Lipex London, Lonap London, Manap Manchester, Xchangepoint
London, Equinix 7 locations USA, Jpnap Tokyo). Other European IXPs were included (Free-ix Paris,
Inxs Munich, Nl-ix Amsterdam, Swiss-ix Zurich) and Extra-European IXPs (Ape Auckland, Hk-ix
Hong Kong, Jp-ix Tokyo, Nyi-ix New York, Six Seattle, Tor-ix Toronto).
32 In order to generate this matrix of data we created a visual basic routine that cross-checked the
memberships for each pair of providers among the most important IXPs all over the world. See
footnote 33 for the list of IXPs considered.
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dist_hq 0.025 0.044
(2.83) (3.01)
both_ixp 0.281 0.463
(10.45) (9.91)
diff_ixp 0.043 0.070
(3.67) (3.62)
diff_bet -0.128 -0.220
(23.87) (20.90)
constant -0.096 -0.170
(1.80) (1.90)
Number of Observations 4753 4753
Percent of correctly predicted 0.686 0.687
Pseudo R-Square 0.1638 0.1637
Log-likelihood value -2723.59 -2723.89
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
Probit and logit produce very consistent results. All the variables introduced
are statistically significant. Interestingly, the two variables representing the
competitors’ asymmetry seem to have opposite effects. Indeed, the
difference in the betweenness, which has also the highest z statistic, is
negatively related to peering, while the difference in the customer cone
positively affects peering.
A possible interpretation relies upon the fact that customer cone
expresses asymmetry in “size”, while the betweenness expresses asymmetry
in “market power associated to unavoidability”. The asymmetry in size can be
seen as a differentiating element, which lowers the extent of competition
between providers, hence reducing business stealing and positively affecting
peering. On the other hand, the asymmetry in the betweenness expresses
difference in the bargaining power associated to the traffic routing;
moreover, since high betweenness presumably implies a large traffic, this
measure of asymmetry may also indicate traffic imbalances between pairs of
providers.  In this case, hence, both the backbone free riding and the business
stealing effects play a decisive role against peering.
Our results also show that peering seems more likely when the
geographical differentiation increases: both the distance between
headquarters, as well as the geographic IXP’s coverage, positively affect
peering. Finally, the mutual presence at several IXPs increases the chances of
peering, following the logic of the hot potato effect; an alternative
interpretation of this result lies instead  on the importance of knowledge and
reputation effects on peering decisions. The estimated partial effects (see
Appendix) provide some evidence about the magnitude of the covariates’
effects on peering.
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An effective measure of the estimated model’s goodness of fit is related
to the percent of correctly predicted pairs. Among the 4753 pairs, 2674
peering agreements were inferred using the algorithms described in Section
4; hence, the peering ratio is 0.562. If we were asked to predict the
interconnection regime based on this information only, we would always
predict peering, being right in the 56.2% of the cases. The use of the
estimated model significantly improves the predictions: the percent of
correct predictions is 0.686 for both probit and logit, with an improvement
by 22% relatively to the rule “always predict peering”. Moreover, in this case
we are able to predict both peering and no interconnection. The Pseudo R-
Square is 0.164 for both probit and logit. A RESET test was conducted to test
the hypothesis of no misspecification of the econometric model. Results are
in the direction of no misspecification for both probit and logit (see
Appendix).
6 Conclusions
In recent years, many game theoretic models have analysed  interconnection
agreements between Internet Operators, at the same time there is an
increasing interest in this issue among Competition Authorities. A relevant
question is whether or not the asymmetry between Providers affects the
“fairness” of their interconnection contracts, eventually leading to
interconnection quality degradation. While theoretical models provide
contrasting results, there is a lack of empirical analysis on this issue. This
work fills  this gap: we provide some  empirical evidence thanks to a novel
approach to obtain data about interconnection regimes, which are otherwise
usually kept confidential by the Internet Operators. In particular, we
exploited some  recent advances in the field of  Theoretical Computer
Science providing the tools to infer the interconnection agreements from
publicly available data.
Our model focused on the interconnection patterns between competing
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) at the London Internet Exchange Point
(LINX). We investigated if asymmetry is associated to quality degradation,
expressed by the refusal of peering by the larger providers.
We introduced two distinct metrics to model the providers’
asymmetry:  the customer cone, providing a proxy for “market share” and the
betweenness, expressing the market power of any given player, by showing
its degree of unavoidability in the Internet traffic routing.
The binary model introduced showed a particularly interesting result:
the two measures used to represent asymmetry have opposite effects on the
interconnection quality among pairs of providers. Hence we suggest  that
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the contrasting results achieved in the game theoretic literature can be seen
in the light of  which type of asymmetry prevails: Crèmer, Rey and Tirole,
(2000), findings reflect   a dominant role of asymmetry in terms of network
centrality, expressing  relative market power, on the other hand, the results
obtained by Foros and Hansen (2001), and Economides (2005),  pointing to a
major role played by differentiation and network externalities in driving the
peering decision33 can be seen as linked to a notion of asymmetry in  terms
of customer shares .
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Appendix
Table A.1: ISPs binary models, variables summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
peering = 1  (2674 obs)
diff_24s 24.73925 64.24227 0 380.151
dist_hq 2.272856 2.40177 0 12.20257
both_ixp 1.586761 0.888546 1 6
diff_ixp 2.280853 1.726976 0 8
diff_bet 1.628163 2.388645 0 16.45
peering = 0  (2079 obs)
diff_24s 14.12309 39.74619 0 380.151
dist_hq 2.032935 2.286581 0 12.2011
both_ixp 1.299663 0.60885 1 5
diff_ixp 2.060125 1.638311 0 8
diff_bet 5.674763 6.65285 0 16.414
Table A.2: RESET test for probit and logit
Dependent Variable: peering
Independent Variable Probit Logit
diff_24s 0.005 0.009
(6.32) (6.12)
dist_hq 0.028 0.048
(3.02) (3.03)
both_ixp 0.345 0.534
(5.21) (4.88)
diff_ixp 0.050 0.078
(3.71) (3.49)
diff_bet -0.144 -0.239
(8.78) (8.29)
24
fitvar2 -0.522 -0.575
(1.06) (0.71)
constant 0.013 -0.050
(0.11) (0.26)
Number of Observations 4753 4753
Pseudo R-Square 0.1640 1638
Log-likelihood value -2723.0329 -2723.6346
RESET test fitvar2 = 0
chi2(  1) =    1.11
Prob > chi2 =    0.2914
fitvar2 = 0
chi2(  1) =    0.50
Prob > chi2 =    0.4777
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
Table A.3: ISPs binary model partial effects
Dependent Variable: P(y=1|x)
Independent Variable Probit Logit  x
diff_24s 0.001748 0.002031 20.0957
(10.26) (9.26)
dist_hq 0.00974 0.01082 2.16791
(2.83) (3.01)
both_ixp 0.111385 0.115027 1.46118
(10.45) (9.91)
diff_ixp 0.017183 0.017395 2.1843
(3.67) (3.62)
diff_bet -0.0507 -0.05469 3.39818
(23.87) (20.90)
Number of Observations 4753 4753
y  = Pr(peering) (predict) .54626609 .54251271
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
